Towards Practical Private Internet Routing using MPC



Privacy-preserving interdomain routing at Internet scale (PETS'17) SIXPACK: Securing Internet eXchange Points Against Curious onlooKers (CoNEXT'17)

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MOTIVATION: BGP AND ROUTING ON THE INTERNET









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Motivation




The Border Gateway Protocol (**BGP**) connects the Internet

- Route computation between ISPs
- Route *dispatch* at IXPs

Issues with BGP

- Slow convergence
- Privacy

We use MPC to approach these!











Privacy-Preserving Inter-Domain Routing

BGP for **computation** of inter-domain routes for the Internet

Original Idea [GSP+, Hotnets'12] – Only toy example, impractical runtime

Our Work [A**D**S⁺, PETS'17] – Real-world parameters:

>51.000 autonomous systems (domains) with >196.000 connections

Topology from the CAIDA AS relation dataset

We protect the **relations** between ASes

Customer / Provider or Peering

More generic: Allow routing based on private AS preferences.









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
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Privacy-Preserving Inter-Domain Routing



Centralized approach: faster & privacy issues solved by MPC

- 2 computational parties (CPs), running our protocol
- CPs are semi-honest and non-colluding
- Each AS secret-shares his relation info/preferences with the CPs











Privacy-Preserving Inter-Domain Routing

Routing based on **relationship** between nodes:

Customers pay providers to route traffic

Peers route traffic for free

"Economically driven" routing instead of shortest paths

High-level Neighbor Relation Algorithm:

Plaintext input: Topology, Target AS – Private input: EP-Relations

10 iterations for customer relation hops

1 iteration for peer hops

10 iterations for provider hops


Private output: for every AS the next hop to target AS














BGP Example – Notation



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
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Public network topology

Node 16 is added








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Routes through **customers** to 16






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Routes through **peers** to 16
















Routes through **providers** to 16





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Preference-Based Routing



Routing based on **export policy** and **preference** between nodes:

ASes decide which routes are *published (exported)*

ASes have preferences for their neighbors

High-level Neighbor Preference Algorithm:

Plaintext input: Topology, Target AS – Private input: EP - Preferences

21 Iterations:

for all ASes:

for all of the ASes neighbors:

find highest **preference** neighbor with **published** route to **target**

Private output: for every AS next hop to target AS









Privacy-Preserving BGP – Circuit



Algorithm implemented as Boolean circuit evaluated with GMW

- SIMD operations
 - 1 Operation for multiple bits in parallel
 - Process all nodes in parallel
- Efficient MUX with vector ANDs in GMW
 - only 1 OT for *n*-bit values
- Tree structure for depth-efficient parallel evaluation
- ASes evaluated in groups of similar degree

Algorithmic optimization: Exclude stub nodes












BGP Stub Nodes



Stub nodes: Nodes that are only customers, not peers, not providers.

85% of all ASes!





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
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CAIDA BGP Statistics 1998 – 2016





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BGP MPC Benchmarks – Internet Topology

Setup Phase Runtime



Online Phase Runtime

Runtime [s] Full, Neighbor Pref. Full, Neighbor Relation - -

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In No Stubs, Neighbor Pref. — No Stubs, Neighbor Relation








BGP MPC Benchmarks – RIR Topology







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Possible Deployment



Instantiate one party with a somewhat trustworthy entity:

RIPE, DENIC, NANOG, etc. - often co-located at IXPs

Parallel Execution for fault tolerance / robustness

Software-Defined-Networking for deployment









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


SIXPACK – PRIVACY-PRESERVING ROUTE DISPATCHING AT IXPS

[CDCSS, CoNEXT'17]







Members (ASes) connect to IXP to exchange routing information via BGP. IXP dispatches routes based on export policies & auxiliary information.

Problem: Export policies & preferences are sensitive business information! Survey with 119 network operators confirm privacy & control issues.

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






SIXPACK





SIXPACK: Securing Internet eXchange Points Against Curious onlooKers. We split the IXP into (at least) 2 computational parties than run SIXPACK. Route servers are semi-honest and non-colluding.












SIXPACK: EXPORT-ALL Approach







Dispatch all routes that are allowed by the export policy of Member mA



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
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SIXPACK: SELECT-BEST Approach







Goal: Find a single *best route* for every member

Based on the private combination of

- Export Policy (as before)
- Local Preference of Members
- Congestion and other Quality of Service info from the IXP









SIXPACK: Implementation



MPC Implementation using the GMW protocol in ABY

Demonstrator in Python that simulates network members and their route announcements and withdrawals

Simulation based on a network trace from one of the largest IXPs in the world (750 members, ~10 BGP updates / sec)








SIXPACK: Runtimes





Number of available routes per prefix

MPC implementation ready for real-time application!





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ABY – A FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTING MPC PROTOCOLS

[**D**SZ, NDSS'15]






Framework for hybrid secure 2-party computation

Efficient Mixed-Protocol Secure Computation:

Arithmetic Sharing

Boolean Sharing (with the GMW protocol)

Yao's Garbled Circuits



Separate Setup Phase (precomputable) and Online Phase










ABY – Development









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ABY – The Framework



Open-source C/C++ framework: <u>encrypto.de/code/ABY</u>



Many recent optimizations included

Abstracts from underlying circuit and protocol details

Many building blocks already included: ADD, MUX, MIN, ...

Efficient conversion between protocols, based on OT

Built-in performance analysis

Continuously improved and extended











Security against malicious (active) Adversaries

Secure *Multi*-Party Computation (*n*>2 parties)



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Summary



Privacy-Preserving **BGP Route Computation** at Internet-scale

Privacy-Preserving **Route Dispatching** at IXPs at real-world scale with practical performance

The **ABY framework** as a tool for implementing MPC protocols











Thanks for your attention!

Questions?

Contact: encrypto.de









References



[ADS+17] – G. Asharov, D. Demmler, M. Schapira, T. Schneider, G. Segev, S. Shenker, and M. Zohner. **Privacy-preserving interdomain routing at Internet scale**. *Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PoPETs)*, 2017(3)

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[DSZ15] – D. Demmler, T. Schneider, and M. Zohner. ABY - a framework for efficient mixedprotocol secure two-party computation. In 22. Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS'15)

[GSP+12] D. Gupta, A. Segal, A. Panda, G. Segev, M. Schapira, J. Feigenbaum, J. Rexford, and S. Shenker. **A new approach to interdomain routing based on secure multi-party computation.** In *ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks (HotNets'12)*



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