Matthijs Smakman, HU University of Applied Sciences Utrecht, NL

Using Roger Crisp’s [1] arguments for well-being as the ultimate source of moral reasoning, this paper argues that there are no ultimate, non-derivative reasons to program robots with moral concepts such as moral obligation, morally wrong or morally right. Although these moral concepts should not be used to program robots, they are not to be abandoned by humans since there are still reasons to keep using them, namely: as an assessment of the agent, to take a stand or to motivate and reinforce behaviour. Because robots are completely rational agents they do not need these additional motivations, they can suffice with a concept of what promotes well-being. How a robot knows which action promotes well-being to the greatest degree is still up for debate, but a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches seem to be the best way

[1] Crisp, R. (2006). Reasons and The Good. Oxford: Clarendon Press